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Towards Principled Regulation 
of Automated Decision-Making 
(ADM)  
 
– A Workshop Report 
 
by FLORENT THOUVENIN, ALFRED FRUEH, TERESA 
RUDOLPH, and SIMON HENSELER (all University of 
Zurich) as well as invited experts EMRE BA-
YAMLIOGLU (Tilburg University), NADJA BRAUN 
BINDER (University of Basel), CHRISITAN KATZEN-
BACH (Humboldt Institute for Internet and Socie-
ty), JOSHUA KROLL (Naval Postgraduate School), 
MOMIN MALIK (Berkman Klein Center for Internet 
& Society, Harvard University), MATTHIAS 
SPIELKAMP (AlgorithmWatch). 
 
From 12 to 14 September 2019, the aforemen-
tioned group of international experts in the fields 
of law, computer science and communication 
studies discussed issues surrounding the topic of 
“Automated Decision-Making” at a workshop 
hosted by ITSL in Lavin/Zernez, Switzerland. The 
workshop is part of an ITSL research project on 
Automated Decision-Making funded by the Has-
ler Stiftung and was sponsored by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation (SNSF).  
 
Some of the main insights and/or ideas dis-
cussed at the workshop are the following: 
 
1. Terminology:  
Automated Decision-Making 
Regulators in the EU and Switzerland have en-
acted or drafted data protection provisions to 
regulate automated decision-making. At present, 
these provisions only pertain to decisions that are 
solely based on automated processing of per-
sonal data. In addition, they only include deci-
sions that have a legal effect on individuals or 
that affect individuals in a similarly significant 
way. In principle, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) prohibits automated decision-
making that falls under its scope but it contains a 
number of exceptions (art. 22 GDPR). In con-
trast, the Draft Swiss Data Protection Act (Draft 
DPA) mainly contains information duties (art. 19 
Draft DPA). 
 
However, on closer inspection, the term automa-
ted decision-making, which aims to define the 
scope of application of art. 22 GDPR and art. 19 
Draft DPA is neither precise nor operable for 
several reasons: 
 
1.1 The term “decision-making” has neither 
a precise meaning nor does it clearly limit 
the scope of application. From a technical 
perspective, for example, everything a 
machine does can be understood as deci-
sion-making; most often, the decision in-
volves producing a specific output based 
on a specific input by applying pre-defined 
rules. The term decision-making is there-
fore unable to draw a line between differ-
ent uses of machines. 
1.2 Moreover, the term “automated” is not 
well suited to capturing the phenomenon. 
“Automation” means solving a problem by 
applying a given set of rules. Automated 
tasks can therefore be performed by ma-
chines as well as humans. 
1.3 In addition, the term “automated decision-
making” can be regarded as an oxymoron 
because automation is only possible if all 
necessary decisions have been made and 
the necessary steps have been defined in 
the set of rules that will be applied. There-
fore, automation does not capture the de-
cision-making process, but rather moves it 
to an earlier stage, one where the details 
of particular cases may not yet be fully 
formed or visible. 
1.4 The formulation “solely based on auto-
mated decision-making” aims to further de-
fine the types of decisions that raise con-
cerns and the scope of application of the 
regulation. However, the issues at stake 
do not disappear if there is some (minimal) 
human intervention. Accordingly, decision 
support systems, in which human deci-
sion-makers are supported by a system in-
tended to improve performance, must be 
included as well. While we can assume 
that a minimal degree of machine interven-
tion would not be a sufficient criterion for 
regulation, it seems impossible to define 
the (approximate) degree of machine in-
tervention needed to trigger the concerns. 
1.5 Given the context of data protection law, 
the provisions in the GDPR and the Draft 
DPA do not address decisions that are not 
based on the use of personal data. This 
is hardly satisfying, as such decisions may 
have similarly detrimental effects on indi-
viduals, specific groups, or society at large 
(e.g. predictive policing used to identify ar-
eas where crimes are likely to occur). 
1.6 Because of these terminological prob-
lems, it is impossible to delineate the 
scope of application of art. 22 GDPR and 
art. 19 Draft DPA. To define the scope of 
application, we need to re-construct the 
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legislators’ intention when they used the 
term “automated decision-making” by ana-
lysing the rationale behind the regulation 
and the phenomena that these norms 
were meant to capture. 
1.7 Although we acknowledge the failure of 
the term “automated decision-making” 
(ADM) to define the scope of application of 
a regulation, we will still use that term in 
the following as it is already established 
and allows for some sort of intuitive under-
standing of the phenomenon. However, 
the definition of the term ADM is unrelated 
to the established meaning of the terms 
“automated” and “decision-making”. 
2. Phenomena  
2.1 The term “ADM” encompasses phenome-
na such as traffic lights, e-recruiting prac-
tices, facial recognition systems, spam fil-
ters, risk assessment tools, predictive po-
licing etc. (For further examples see Au-
tomating Society, Taking Stock of Auto-
mated Decision-Making in the EU, availa-
ble at www.algorithmwatch.ch/automating-
society). As becomes apparent from these 
examples, ADM systems are used in al-
most all areas of life. 
2.2 Some ADM systems rely on automatically 
found correlations, rather than a reasoned 
study of causality or human judgements 
about responsibility, for making a “deci-
sion”. This can be problematic and raises 
concerns. For example, a bank may reject 
a credit application, not based on a deter-
mination of whether the applicant is sol-
vent or intends to avoid repayment of the 
amount due, but because he or she lives 
in a district of a city in which people have 
failed to repay their debts. Such correla-
tion-based decisions are far easier for 
banks to make, and indeed may be far 
more effective at decreasing their risks 
than trying to make reasoned judgements 
about specific individuals; but this effec-
tively passes risk onto consumers, who 
are rewarded or punished for circumstan-
tial (although robust) connections. As 
there might be an underlying causal link 
between where one chooses to live, or is 
forced to live, and failing to repay a loan, it 
is not where one lives that itself causes 
non-payment. 
3. Rationale 
There are different rationales for regulating ADM. 
The most relevant basis for regulation is the diffi-
culty most humans have in sufficiently under-
standing what processes are executed and how 
those processes are related to outcomes when 
decisions are taken automatically. In particular, 
when decisions are based on correlations rather 
than causality, this opacity points to the need to 
regulate ADM. 
Notwithstanding the above-expressed reserva-
tions, provisions addressing ADM may be based, 
inter alia, on the following rationales:  
a) Object formula 
 
3.1 Some argue that the rationale behind 
regulating ADM is that a human being 
should not be the object of a decision tak-
en by a machine (object formula), as this 
would threaten human dignity and auton-
omy. 
3.2 This reasoning fails to take into account 
that, according to the technical status quo, 
any decision requires human planning and 
rule-making. The object formula also 
misses the relevant point, which is whether 
human beings are treated as objects – ir-
respective of whether the entity treating 
them as an object is a human or a ma-
chine. 
b) (Poor) Decision Quality 
 
3.3 The first provisions regulating ADM were 
based on the presumption that automated 
decision-making would yield poor results, 
especially compared to human decisions.  
3.4 This no longer holds true. In many instan-
ces, ADM systems outperform humans. If 
they do not, they are usually only used if 
they are on par with human decisions. If 
an ADM system yields (relatively) poor re-
sults, its use may still be attractive for oth-
er reasons such as scale, speed and lower 
costs. In these cases, the poor quality of 
the decisions may be problematic. Such 
problems, however, also exist with human 
decision-making, e.g. if people making de-
cisions lack sufficient skills, information or 
time. 
c) Transparency 
 
3.5 ADM systems can lack transparency. Of-
ten, individuals are not aware that an ADM 
system has been used. As a conse-
quence, they cannot resort to data subject 
rights provided for by data protection law 
or use alternative services that do not in-
volve ADM. 
3.6 Even if individuals know that an ADM sys-
tem was used, they will (in all likelihood) 
have no idea how the ADM system works. 
This is particularly problematic with corre-
lation-based ADM systems, which are 
harder to explain and understand than 
causality-based ADM systems. 
3.7 Nevertheless, transparency is not an end 
in itself, but rather a means to an end. It is, 
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for instance, an instrument to achieve au-
tonomy and accountability. 
d) Fairness 
 
3.8 Many argue that fairness is at risk when 
actors use ADM. Depending on the under-
standing of the term, an ADM system can 
be considered ”unfair” if it explicitly uses 
protected characteristics, such as race, 
age, gender (etc.) or their proxies. Accord-
ing to another understanding, unfair ADM 
systems give rise to disparate measures of 
predictive performance, such as false posi-
tive and false negative rates, across 
groups (especially groups defined by the 
protected characteristics). 
3.9 In addition, a decision taken by an ADM 
system may seem unfair if it is based on 
correlations that have no comprehensible 
connection to the issue at stake. For ex-
ample, just because a place of residence 
is highly correlated with defaulting (i.e. 
people living in the same district have de-
faulted), it is not living in a place itself that 
causes defaulting. Perhaps there is some 
underlying connection between defaulting 
and where one chooses to or is forced to 
live, but using that circumstantial connec-
tion – as robust as it may be – as the basis 
for making judgements may be the issue 
of concern. 
e) Ensuring a feedback mechanism 
 
3.10 Although the word “prediction” is often 
used when describing ADM systems, 
these systems do not predict anything. In-
stead, they are trained to “perfect the pre-
sent” and thus perpetuate the status quo. 
If the systems are not fed with new data, 
the reliability of the systems can be in 
jeopardy. The same might happen if it 
turns out that the correlations used do not 
produce convincing results. For this rea-
son, there should be relevant incentives 
for users of ADM systems to implement 
feedback mechanisms that allow individu-
als being subject to ADM to raise con-
cerns.  
3.11 The implementation of feedback mecha-
nisms should facilitate an adaptation of the 
criteria and an amendment of the data set 
used by an ADM system and ultimately 
lead to better results. However, simply 
adding additional data points created in a 
similar way will not be sufficient to ensure 
improvements. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Regulatory Approach 
a) Scope of application 
 
While it is clear that the scope of application of a 
(potential) regulation of ADM needs to be defined 
in a clear and concise manner, it remains unclear 
where to draw the line. The following criteria 
could be useful to define which ADM systems 
must be subject to a regulation: 
 
4.1 Although no categorical distinction can be 
made between decisions by humans and 
machines, the involvement of a machine 
as such and the level of its involvement 
should be a relevant criterion. Otherwise, a 
given regulation would also apply to all 
sorts of human decisions, which was clear-
ly not the intention of the legislator. 
4.2 As correlation-based decisions raise more 
concerns than causality-based decisions, 
the use of correlations may trigger the 
need for regulation. However, it remains 
unclear whether the scope of application 
of a regulation should be restricted to cor-
relation-based ADM systems or whether a 
regulation should also address causality-
based decisions, especially because the 
lack of accurate data can lead to problem-
atic results when using either approach. 
4.3 Some ADM systems are (potentially) more 
harmful for individuals, groups or the soci-
ety at large than others (e.g. e-recruiting 
systems as opposed to traffic lights). 
Hence, the potential impact of an ADM 
system on people’s life chances and social 
participation should be taken into consid-
eration when carving out the scope of ap-
plication of a regulation. 
4.4 The number of individuals concerned by a 
decision taken by an ADM system might 
be important (e.g. decisions on credit ap-
plications vs. predictive policing). 
4.5 A de minimis rule could be used to exclude 
trivial and clearly unproblematic ADM sys-
tems from the scope of application of an 
ADM regulation. 
A concrete proposal for a clearly defined scope of 
application cannot be made at this point. For this 
purpose, further research is needed. Although 
the scope of application remains unclear, it 
seems possible to sketch out the normative con-
tent of a regulation of ADM systems. 
b) Regulatory proposal 
 
The rationales behind an ADM regulation do not 
justify a prohibition of ADM systems. Rather, the 
relevant concerns, such as understanding the 
processes carried out, whether they are fair and 
whether they entail feedback mechanisms can be 
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addressed by granting far-reaching but layered 
transparency. 
It is currently unclear which body of law is best 
suited to introduce such transparency require-
ments. To solve this issue, further research 
needs to be carried out. In any case, the scope of 
application should not be restricted to ADM sys-
tems that are based on the processing of per-
sonal data. 
The proposed regulatory approach should differ 
for the private and the public sector.  
i. Private sector 
In the private sector, we suggest that the follow-
ing transparency requirements apply horizontally, 
i.e. for all sectors. 
 
4.6 In the first layer, a basic transparency 
requirement obliges any private entity ap-
plying an ADM system in an interaction 
with an individual to inform this individual 
about the use of the system. Based on this 
information, individuals could make an in-
formed decision and either use a different 
service provider or stay with the same one. 
Upon request, the private entity could pro-
vide further information to the individual on 
the type of ADM system used and the logic 
involved but it would not be legally obliged 
to do so. 
4.7 In the second layer, an extended trans-
parency requirement is introduced. This 
obligation comes into play in specific cir-
cumstances, namely with regard to the im-
pact of the decision on an individual, a 
specific group or society at large. The pur-
pose of this extended transparency re-
quirement is to put individuals in a position 
to contest ADM results affecting them. 
Therefore, individuals must be able to re-
trieve all relevant information about what 
happened and about what has led to the 
outcome of the decision. This transparen-
cy requirement is of quasi-procedural na-
ture. It allows individuals to gather infor-
mation that they can use to contest the au-
tomated decision legally, assuming such a 
basis exists (e.g. in anti-discrimination 
law). 
4.8 Often, individuals do not use their rights. 
Therefore, and to accommodate concerns 
on a group or societal level, authorities 
could be vested with the power to take up 
cases in which the use of ADM systems 
has a relevant impact on a specific group 
or the society at large, e.g. if a certain 
group is structurally discriminated against. 
ii. Public sector 
In the public sector, another regulatory approach 
is advisable. 
4.9 Any public authority using an ADM system 
when interacting with individuals should be 
required to disclose the use of this system 
in a dedicated public register. The register 
would contain the ADM system’s purpose 
of use, an explanation of the model (logic 
involved) and the information on who de-
signed the system. In addition, every indi-
vidual being subject to an ADM system 
should be informed accordingly. 
4.10 If a government agency uses ADM sys-
tems when issuing an administrative order 
or a court uses ADM systems to take a ju-
dicial decision, an extended transparency 
requirement should be introduced. Its pur-
pose and content concur with the extend-
ed transparency requirement for the pri-
vate sector (see 4.7) 
iii. Sector-specific approach 
4.11 The general transparency requirements in 
private and public law may be complemen-
ted by existing (and future) sector-specific 
provisions. If a sector-specific regulation 
exists, the applicable provisions should 
deal with the risks associated with the use 
of ADM systems. Such rules already exist 
in the financial market, labour, food safety, 
transportation safety and health sector, 
among others. Medical diagnostic soft-
ware, for example, has to meet regulatory 
standards or have regulatory approval in 
order to be marketed; the software has to 
pass a test for safety and effectiveness for 
the intended use. In sectors that already 
have specific rules in place, the general 
transparency requirements may not pro-
vide much value at the margin; but they 
will not be invasive in such circumstances. 
In some sectors, however, the general 
transparency requirements will help to fill 
existing gaps, e.g. in labour relations, 
when an individual is subject to an ADM 
performance scoring system. 
4.12 Against the background of existing (and 
future) sector-specific rules, there is no 
general need for a right to human interven-
tion or a right to contest the outcome of 
ADM systems. It would be particularly diffi-
cult to justify the introduction of a right to 
contest a decision merely because this 
decision was taken by an ADM system in-
stead of a human being. Instead, the aim 
of an ADM regulation must be to provide 
the individuals concerned with the infor-
mation needed to take advantage of the 
existing legal remedies. Introducing the 
above-mentioned transparency require-
ments achieves this objective in an appro-
priate way. 
 
        *   *   * 
